Does the left gain when the economy is down?

There’s an interesting debate going on in the Globe and Mail about the role of the NDP and the reason why it doesn’t seem to be making headlines these days despite the economic downturn – the question Lawrence Martin asks (see Letters to the editor responses) in the article that kicked off the discussion is that, when capitalism is in crisis, shouldn’t the left see gains?

It’s logical to think that the NDP should make gains during tough times as people look for alternatives to the economic system that may be causing them hardship. This might partially explain the NDP’s surprising win in Ontario in 1990.

However, it’s also possible that a sinking economy might actually harm the left electorally. In good times, voters may feel more comfortable having their government deal with issues that people perceive to be left: addressing poverty and inequality, expanding social programs, funding the CBC, mandating environmentally-friendly behaviours, etc. In tough times, voters often focus on the economy as the sole issue, and the Conservatives have traditionally been best at branding themselves as economic managers. Besides, in bad times, governments of all stripes will tend to sound and act a little like New Democrats: showing concern about rising unemployment, wanting to curb or prevent poverty, speaking about education and training, penalizing arrogant corporate leaders, and actively intervening in the economy where it’ll save some jobs and earn points with voters.

I decided to see if I could see any relationship between economic ups and downs and federal voting behaviour for the past several decades. There are two charts I've created (click to enlarge). The one on top shows the share of popular vote received by right wing parties (Conservatives, Progressive Conservatives, Canadian Alliance, Reform party and Social Credit/Ralliement créditiste) and left wing parties (one bar shows just the NDP; another shows the NDP grouped with the Greens and the Bloc, which assumes we can lump those parties in as left) since 1972.

In the chart, the right-wing vote appears relatively consistent outside of the two big Mulroney victories in the 1980s. The drop in the NDP vote from 1993 to 2000 also stands out, but its vote is otherwise remarkably consistent from 1972 to 2008. The combined "left" vote begins to differ from the NDP as the Bloc emerged in the early 90s. The grouped left vote stands out as very strong in each of the last three elections, with 2008 representing a high water mark.

I included in the bottom chart two economic indicators. The first is the annual unemployment rate and the second is the quarter-over-quarter real GDP growth rate.

The unemployment rate curve shows two dramatic peaks – one in 1983 and one in 1993. Interestingly, the two biggest electoral shifts over the period also occurred around those times. The first, in 1984, swept Mulroney to power with the largest majority in Canadian history. The second, in 1993, did the opposite, nearly wiping out the Progressive Conservatives and vaulting the Chrétien Liberals into power.

What's striking about the GDP growth curve is the relative flatness since about 1981 and especially during the 1990s. In the past ten years, quarter-to-quarter growth has been mostly positive, but is relatively inconsistent, with 9/11 having a noticeable negative impact in 2001. The plunge at the end of 2008 appears dramatic when compared historically.

So can we conclude any relationship between swings to the left or right and economic downturns? Not likely, at least not based on the data I've presented. Interesting shifts in the popular vote do appear, but they don't seem to be dependent on economic upturns or downturns. Economic shifts probably do affect voter behaviour, but not in ways that are entirely predictable. Furthermore, the traction that a party may get politically isn't always evident in the electoral numbers. Having an influence on the policy process and in the marketplace of ideas – regardless of which party ultimately takes credit – is something that can’t be measured here.

Free Press Insiders polls

Is it just me or is the Winnipeg Free Press taking some liberties in the way that it's publishing the results of its Free Press Insiders polls?

The Free Press seems to be portraying the results as if they're representative of voting intentions in Manitoba and in specific Manitoba ridings. However, the poll isn't a random sample of eligible voters; it's a large Internet panel of Free Press readers. As such, the poll results are, at best, only representative of Free Press readers.

If the panelists differ from electors in their voting intentions -- something that's certainly possible given that the panelists are disproportionately Internet-savvy newspaper readers -- then the published numbers aren't indicative of party standings.

Elections Canada has some very specific rules associated with the publishing of election polls. These include indicating a poll's margin of error and whether the survey was not conducted using recognized statistical methods. I don't see either in the Free Press article.

Clearly, if a margin of error applies to these results, it should be indicated along with a note that riding-by-riding numbers are less robust than the province-wide numbers. If a margin of error doesn't apply because the poll isn't scientific, then that should be made clear in the article.

Even if Elections Canada's requirements were met in an adjoining article I missed, omitting the standard caveats from a presentation of the poll results threatens to mislead the voting public. For those thinking of voting strategically and relying on the Free Press to inform themselves, that's a big problem.


SEPT 26 UPDATE: Accompanying today's Free Press Insider poll results is a cautionary note that the poll results "do not necessarily reflect the views of the entire Winnipeg or Manitoba poplation" along with more information about the sample size and methodology. The inclusion of this information represents a big improvement -- it's clear and allows readers to put the poll results in context.

Dreaming big

Following a stream of historically poor Liberal poll numbers, some campaign observers are beginning to ask whether the NDP is about to surpass the Liberals (see here, here and here) and form Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition in the next parliament.

Indeed, the big fantasy of the federal NDP, and likely a prerequisite for the party to ever become a true national contender for power, has always been to surpass the Liberal Party. New Democrtas believe this milestone would give rise to a new political polarization between the right and left, thus damning the Liberals to the political wilderness forever.

This thinking is never far from the minds of NDP strategists, who face the tricky task of fighting the Tories without inadvertently sinking themselves by helping the Liberals who, for their part, adeptly hug the middle, adopting the rhetoric and policies of the right or the left in whatever combination is most likely to win them power.

The model of political polarization the NDP seeks emerged in Britain in the first half of the 20th century as the Labour Party surpassed the Liberals, who were never again to taste power. Canadian examples can be found in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and BC, though sometimes this is in a two-party system with the Liberals on the right (e.g., Saskatchewan's anti-medicare Liberals of the 1960s and 1970s and the current right-leaning Liberals in BC, who replaced the Social Credit Party there). Polarization is arguably occurring in Nova Scotia where the NDP appears close to winning power and the Liberals slip further into third place every election.

The big question: can it happen federally? As things stand, the New Democrats are likely to make gains and the Liberals likely to suffer losses, but can the shift be dramatic enough for the NDP to form Official Opposition? Some polls show the gap between the two parties to be as little as 3%, a level of competitiveness not seen since around 1990.

So what would it take?

First, it's important to note that the NDP need not necessarily surpass the Liberals in popular vote to surpass them in seats. This is because, generally-speaking, the Liberals' votes tend to be more evenly spread than either the Conservatives' or the NDPs' votes, which tend to be concentrated in particular areas. This tends to make the Liberals more efficient than other parties at converting votes into seats when they're popular but less inefficient than other parties when they're unpopular. In 1984, the Liberal-NDP gap was 28% to 19%, but the seat gap was only 40-30. Another percentage point or two might have pushed the NDP into second.

To come in second in this election, the NDP would likely have to win at least 60 seats or so, with the Liberals falling below that number. The losses for the Liberals in Ontario, where they won 54 seats in 2006, would have to especially large. Specifically, we'd need to see the following:

Ontario

Liberal numbers would have to drop below 30% from the mid-to-high 30s where they are now, while the NDP would have to climb 5 points or so to the low 20s, with noted strength in northern Ontario. The Tories would break 40%. Liberal losses to both the Conservatives and NDP, plus bleeding to the Greens in vulnerable suburban ridings, would result in a seat count of something like this:
Con 55 / Lib 28 / NDP 23 (2006: Con 40 / Lib 54 / NDP 12)

Quebec

Bloc numbers would have to stay over 30%, around where they're hovering now, as continued Bloc leakage to the Tories and NDP will produce new victories for the Liberals. The Tories would have to stay around their current 30% while the the NDP approached 20% (up from about 15% now). This might yield something like this:
Bloc 33 / Con 23 / Lib 14 / NDP 4 / Ind 1
(2006: Bloc 51 / Con 10 / Lib 13 / Ind 1)

Atlantic Canada

The Tories would need to gain only a few points (to maybe 36%) at the expense of the Liberals for them to steal a number of close Liberal seats in Nova Scotia, PEI and especially New Brunswick. This would offset Tory losses that are all but guaranteed in NL (a victim of Danny Williams's ABC campaign). The NDP, who are already up a few points over their 22% in 2006, would have to eke out a few new victories in St. John's and Nova Scotia. In seats, that would probably come out to something like this:
Con 14 / Lib 10 / NDP 7 / Ind 1
(2006: Con 9 / Lib 20 / NDP 3)

Prairies

On the prairies, a couple of points gained for the NDP over their 2006 numbers could give them up to five more seats (I can't see the party winning more than three in Saskatchewan). The Tories would have to win some, lose some, leaving the Liberals with 1-2 seats in total on the Prairies. That would leave something like the following seat count:
Con 46 / NDP 8 / Lib 2 (2006: Con 48 / NDP 3 / Lib 5)

BC

NDP numbers have been strengthening in BC in the last week. Two or three more points would put them over 30% and win them a few new seats at the expense of both other parties. The Liberals, who are bleeding to the Greens in suburban Vancouver, would see some seat losses to the Tories. That could leave the situation something like this:
Con 18 / NDP 17 / Lib 1 (2006: Con 17 / NDP 10 / Lib 9)

North

A territorial seat for each party as the Cons pick up Nunavut:
Con 1 / Lib 1 / NDP 1 (2006: Lib 2 / NDP 1)

Nationally

In order to make the above happen, the NDP would need something in the range of 22%, while the Liberals could have no more than about 26%. In addition, the shift in numbers would have to be in the right regions. The above seat counts total as follows:
Con 157 / NDP 60 / Lib 56 / Bloc 33 / Ind 2
(2006: Con 124 / Lib 103 / NDP 29 / Bloc 51 / Ind 1)

The above exercise, apart from being fun (it's still more fun than realistic at this point), suggests it's narrowly possible for the NDP to surpass the Liberals. I would suggest that it remains an uphill battle for the NDP and that they shouldn't underestimate the Liberals. Still, a lot can happen in the one month of campaign that remains.

If the Liberals somehow do tank and make a historically poor showing on October 14, they really shouldn't blame Dion, who seems to be a rather decent, intelligent politician. Rather, for a number of reasons, they can place the blame squarely on this fellow.

Photo: The House of Commons (facing the government side)

A two-horse race and other pre-election myths

Today's Globe and Mail pretty much stole the headline I was planning for a blog post: Harper Tories On The Brink Of Majority. This might come as a shock to some pundits who keep looking to tied polling numbers as the be all-end all source of election analysis, so let's bust a few pre-election myths.


Myth: Harper's calling an election, but even he doesn't think he'll get a majority

Reality: The Canadian public are majority-wary and the Tories know this, so of course they're going to downplay their chances. Even if some polls show them hovering somewhere between 32% and 35%, that's only a few points short of majority territory, and they're extraordinarily well-organized and flush with cash. While they sure wouldn't mind a stronger minority and sticking it to the Liberals, as Tom Flanagan suggests, make no mistake -- they're gunning for a majority government and they just might get it.


Myth: The Liberals are neck-and-neck with the Tories and have a decent shot at winning

Reality: Party leaders rarely make gains in their first election campaign, and the odds are even worse for a leader going into the campaign with baggage in the form of a poor image, an unpopular campaign plank, fundraising challenges (now that the days of handouts from corporate Canada are gone), and close to a quarter of the caucus opting not to run again. Those who think the Liberals are in the game to win might want to ask why the party has done absolutely all it could in the last year to avoid an election.


Myth: The NDP is losing ground to the Greens

Reality: Most polls show the NDP holding all or nearly all of its 2006 levels of support and, while the Greens are still up a little over their 2006 levels, most of this added support is in Liberal-friendly suburban Ontario (though even that may vanish as the Liberals continue their fine tradition of "borrowing" the policy planks of other parties).

The NDP hopes to build on its 2006 support with a now-seasoned and well-recognized leader (no campaign gaffes as in 2004), the best-financed and most competitve campaign in the history of the party, a surprising number of "star" candidates who have emerged to run for the party in non-traditional areas, and Liberal slippage to the right (Tory success tends to throw NDP-Liberal battles to the NDP). This should produce new victories in Montreal and Gatineau, northern ridings, industrial Ontario (especially in the wake of news like this), and pockets of support in the West.


Myth: Winning or not, the Greens are more principled than the other parties

Reality: Desperate to do anything to meet the one MP threshold to join the leader's debates, the Greens recently welcomed into their ranks an MP who was kicked out of the Liberal Party for spending irregularities. With their hug-a-Liberal strategy backfiring as the Liberals steal their carbon tax plank, expect the Greens to make a lot of noise and gain a few points in the popular vote, but wind up with a big donut for seats.

A very rough early prediction:

Cons ~152
Libs ~85
NDP ~39
Bloc ~32

Image: Thomas Kelly, "The False Start," 1858. Hand-colored lithograph depicting Jerome Park Racetrack, New York City.

The odds on carbon taxes...

The high-stakes poker game that's leading up to the next election is playing itself out, with each party playing their hands well. The current round: carbon taxes.


The Liberals

Their "green shift" carbon tax proposal is a risky play of political strategy, but it's one that may well have saved them from losing a massive number of seats in the next election. With about a fifth of their caucus not running again, party debts and an apparent inability to fundraise (they're now third in the country in fundraising, behind both the Conservatives and the NDP), stagnant polling numbers, a perception of poor performance by Dion, and a couple of embarrassing byelection losses, many in the party were fearing historic and dramatic losses in the next election. Since the carbon tax proposal, things have cooled down somewhat.

The carbon tax -- even if it may be a tough sell for some Canadians -- finally gives the party the chance to differentiate itself from the Conservatives via a policy it can articulate. For them, that beats the non-strategy of reflexively opposing everything the Conservatives do, or worse, talking down the Conservatives but then tacitly supporting them anyway (the story for most of the past year). Differentiating itself from its opponent across the floor was something the party desperately needed after nearly a year of looking watery, timid and indecisive. What right-leaning voters would want to support a weaker, disorganized version of the governing party?

Differentiation is also something the Liberals need to fend off an attack from the NDP, who most benefits when it can paint the Liberals and Conservatives as interchangeable. The carbon tax proposal, combined with the Dion-May deal, also steals the thunder of the carbon tax-favouring Green Party. Suburban eco-conscious voters who would otherwise have considered voting Green will now find they have little reason to support that party when voting Liberal (as they likely did last time) will be just as likely to bring them "green" policy.

It's the same sneaky strategy the Liberals have used to curb the strength of the NDP for much of the past 50 years: steal the best ideas from their platform and use your organizational machine to take all the credit for them. The Greens have little on-the-ground organization to make up for having the carpet pulled out from under them, especially at a time of likely declining enthusiasm for what many perceive to be their core policy strength. Expect to see their numbers continue to slip to something much closer to the 6% they received in 2006.

Some might ask why Dion is trying so hard to sell the carbon tax in Alberta where the party has no seats and is unlikely to win any in the near future. Why? It probably has less to do with believing oil companies should get on board (suggested in Jeffrey Simpson's article on the carbon tax, Suncor and carbon capture technology) than winning more supporters in Ontario (as Chantal Hébert suggests, noting that this is the same strategy Dion used to win votes in Ontario by trying to sell the Clarity Act to skeptical ears in Quebec).

While I'm certainly no fan of the party, no matter how much they're down, the first rule in federal politics should always be to never underestimate the Liberal Party, one of western democracies most successful political parties.

Risks for the Liberals: Carbon taxes may sell well in some Toronto and Vancouver suburbs, but the party could lose a lot in the rest of the country where they're currently struggling. For them, the worst case scenario: Liberals hang on to Official Opposition status, but not by much. Dion is turfed as leader.

The potential prize: The Liberal strategy gains them few seats, but it also prevents any NDP, Conservative or Green growth. The Liberals come out of the election re-energized and Dion gains a firmer grip over the party leadership.


The NDP

The NDP has probably played its hand well -- at least strategically -- by opposing the carbon tax. It's betting that the negative impact of criticism by David Suzuki and other environmentalists (though many of them like the NDP's cap and trade proposal, and even Suzuki admits that a carbon tax would only be one of a host of solutions necessary to bring about a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions) will be offset by the gains made in non-NDP ridings of the sort where voters are unlikely to be enamoured with any sort of tax on fuel. In particular, the NDP is looking at potential gains in northern regions and especially northern Ontario, rural BC, Saskatchewan, Edmonton, Atlantic Canada, and hard-hit industrial regions of Ontario, such as Oshawa.

As the traditional party representing lower income folks, remote communities, and workers, the NDP is probably also right to put the onus on the Liberals to prove that the consumption-based carbon tax won't in the end hurt those most vulnerable. And, while many have criticized the NDP for preferring to target industry, it is industry that's responsible for the greatest share of emissions.

The risks: Despite some high-profile environmental candidates running in the next election and the party's emphasis on a cap and trade plan, they've allowed the Liberals to take the environment for themselves as an issue of perceived strength (too bad, given the whole lot 'o nothing the Liberals did when they were in government, including when Dion himself was environment minister). Even despite plans for a strong campaign, the NDP risks losing several seats.

The potential prize: If the Liberals fumble and run a disorganized next election, and the NDP manages to connect with voters in Ontario and elsewhere, it isn't inconceivable that they could pick up as many as 30 seats across the country. The party might also capitalize on the BC NDP's opposition to the tax (pity the carbon tax-toting provincial BC Liberals who share voters with the anti-carbon tax federal Conservatives), though that battle is still playing itself out.


The Conservatives

The Conservatives are betting that concern about the economy will take the environment right off the agenda and, where the environment is still an issue, will focus on leaving "market" (i.e., oligopolistic) mechanisms as the best vehicle for reducing carbon emissions. After all, how much will a carbon tax of a few pennies per barrel drive down emissions when the cost of fuel is up over 50% in a year?

Of course, Flaherty has tried to use the economy as a hammer to knock Premier McGuinty (of Ontario, the one place the Liberals are strong these days) with. That strategy's so far failed, but there are signs that the environment is being all but forgotten by voters given their growing economic concern. The Conservative strategy: bide their time while acting like a moderate group of managers, all the while raising big dollars, embarrassing and/or co-opting the opposition as much as possible, and hope that they'll be rewarded in spades come the next election.

The risks: "Wait and see" might be a tough strategy as the economy worsens -- governing parties don't typically do so well when the economy tanks. And now that they've let the Liberals find an issue with which to distinguish themselves, they may have allowed that party to climb back from the near death it would have found itself in had the election been held in early 2008. There's also potential that the NDP could cut into Tory support in certain pockets of BC, Edmonton, Saskatchewan, and Atlantic Canada, thereby offsetting any Conservative gains made at the expense of the Bloc or the Liberals.

The potential prize: The Liberals flounder and Conservatives pick up support in enough suburban and rural seats to make big gains, possibly so far as to claim a majority.


Thoughts and conclusions

Canada certainly needs to move toward curbing emissions. While a carbon tax is an intriguing idea, it's certainly just one tool in the wider toolbox of strategies that can and should be used -- the overwhelming focus on carbon taxes makes it appear as if it were the one and only option ahead of us.

If a carbon tax is implemented, the revenues should be used to alleviate the hit for low income and northern citizens as well as subsidize energy retrofits, mass transit, and green technology, rather than just given away in some supposed "revenue neutral" plan.

Either way, a cap and trade system should be implemented and looks like the way to go, given the support for such a system among most Canadian Premiers, the Conservatives and NDP, and both US Presidential candidates.

The environment certainly should be an election issue, though who knows which way the winds will blow by that time? Fears of economic meltdown may yet dwarf the environment as a primary concern in most voters' minds.


Further reading

By the way, for those following the carbon tax debate, I highly recommend the Progressive Economics Forum blog. Some of the posts on carbon taxes:

Where do greenhouse gases come from? It turns out that households emit one-fifth of Canada's greenhouse gas emissions, while businesses account for five sixths of emissions.

Where do non-fuel emissions come from? Interestingly, Dion's carbon tax scheme has no impact on non-fuel emissions meaning that, for example, one-third of the oil industry's emissions would not be affected.

Responses to high gas prices How elastic is the demand for driving in response to fuel costs? In response to the overall cost of driving? Links to some articles with important implications for understanding behavioural change from driving toward other forms of transportation, such as transit.

Dion's carbon revenues How much do the Liberals propose to raise through carbon taxes and why do forecasts not show this to be a declining revenue stream (assuming that carbon taxes work)?

Carbon taxes, distribution and politics Should the carbon tax really be revenue neutral? Beyond relief for low income folks, perhaps it would be more effective if the revenues were used to subsidize mass transit, energy efficiency retrofits, and green technologies. See also Duncan Cameron's article.

The carbon tax we pay to the oil companies Jim Stanford notes that many of us get angry at the thought of the government taking a couple of cents a litre out of our pocket for a carbon tax, but yet calmly hand over the dough when it's the oil companies asking for 50 cents more per litre.

Dion's green plan or Mintz's tax plan? Is Dion's plan a sly way to simply cut income or corporate taxes? Does it adequately protect lower income folks?

Canada's ecological footprint by income decile Canada's richest 10% have a dramatically larger ecological footprint than even the next decile down, meaning that they may simply buy their way out of changing. Given this, is income tax cuts the most effective use of carbon tax revenues?

Some perspective on carbon taxes BC's carbon tax of $10 per tonne amounts to 2.4 cents per litre. In the past years, the cost of fuel has doubled -- the same as if a carbon tax of $270 per tonne had been levied.

Polling mysticism

So today's poll has the Tories "flirting with a majority." Now wait... didn't yesterday's poll have them in "a dogfight" with the Liberals?

Apparently, yesterday's competitive Liberals are now suddenly today's underdogs fighting even to stay above historic party lows (of which their reported 27% would certainly be). The NDP, whose 12% in today's poll put them well below their 2006 support levels, were just two weeks ago at 19% and apparently well-positioned to make gains. Back then, the Greens found themselves at 7%, a standing barely above their 2006 election result and far short of their apparent rapid ascendance to 13% in the latest poll.

As political observers, we all ooh and ahh at each new horse race figure that's printed in the papers, trying to read into the numbers some sort of truth about who's ahead and who's behind and who's going to be sorry and who's going to be rewarded. The art of poll watching has taken on an almost mystical quality, with its high priests quick to ascribe some dramatic trend or, in some cases, validate the various notions and myths their particular political tribe feels a need to hold on to (which includes partisan false bravado).

For political junkies, prognosticating election results after every poll makes for fun exercise, but it's fairly pointless, for a number of reasons:

• First, most of us who read about polls regularly know some of the reasons that poll numbers jump around: sampling (± a certain percentage, 19 times out of 20) and various sorts of non-sampling errors, and the way survey questions are asked (debates continue about what question wording best replicates how voters are likely to respond upon arriving at the polling booth, something that Blackberry Addicts were never exactly shy about raising).


• Second, polls taken in between elections are often more about party brands than they are about the true competitive standing of each party relative to one another. It's what I often call a "parking lot" effect, in which poll respondents instinctively "park" their vote in between elections. Asked by a pollster who they'll vote for and they'll tend to blurt out whatever party brand they roughly associate with or that happens to be top of mind. The Liberals and Greens tend to be beneficiaries of this tendency in most parts of Canada.


• Third, pre-election campaign polls don't take into account party organization, finances, gaffes or infighting, strategic positioning, the name recognition of incumbent "star" candidates, media exposure, and party messaging, all of which play a huge role in that complex game of chess that plays itself out in each election campaign.
  

For these reasons, the hype that follows most polls tends to be pretty hollow. A better analysis might take into account some of the above factors.

The Greens, currently buoyant in most polls, have considerably less ground organization, campaign experience, cash resources, star candidates, or media exposure than the other three national parties and will almost surely sink when the next election campaign goes live. Nik Nanos, of SES Research, suggests that the Greens typically drop 1/3 of their vote from the last poll to the actual election. That's after the deflation of the Green balloon that's likely to occur during the campaign itself.

The Liberals, in their current state of endless infighting, fundraising difficulties, mass retirement of MPs and loss of valuable potential candidates, to name just a few of their problems, had best shape up and fast if they expect to hold the 27% to 35% the polls currently peg them at.

Worse for the party is the unenviable position they keep backing themselves into: critiquing the government but then doing all they can to make sure it isn't defeated. For them, voting to defeat the government in a confidence motion means risking catastrophic losses in an election (for some of the reasons noted above), yet supporting the government or abstaining from confidence motions means branding themselves as a "weak" opposition that has little alternative agenda to that of the government.

A weak, indistinct, vision-less Liberal Party is one that's going to find itself wedged in an election between the Conservatives and the NDP when centre-right Liberals find they have no reason to vote for a "me too" Liberal rather than a Tory and when centre-left Liberals find that the alternative vision they're looking for lies only with the NDP. Is it any wonder, then, that the Tories and NDP are literally trying to goad the Liberals into an election, while the Liberals are finding ever new and interesting ways to contort themselves in an attempt to avoid just that?

We live in very interesting times.

Photo: a map of the 2006 federal election results.